THE
RHODESIAN GUARD FORCE
Overview / History :
The
establishment of Guard Force, as the fourth arm of the Rhodesian Security
Forces, will always be linked to the
concept of the Protected
Village system as a
counter-insurgency measure by Rhodesian political and military authorities.
The
idea behind this concept was to resettle the African rural population, who
lived in widely dispersed kraals, into protected and consolidated villages. It
was seen as an important measure to protect the rural African population from
intimidation and terror by insurgents and to deprive those insurgents of the
support from the local population. It also made the attempts by insurgents to
politicise and mobilize the people extremely difficult.
The
failures of their first incursions and operational activities at the start of
hostilities, made insurgents recognise that they needed the support of the
local population to succeed. This support required the co-operation of the
local people and included acts of terror, in which persons associated with the Rhodesian
authorities were mutilated and murdered in the most gruesome fashion. Whilst
the victims were mostly rural Africans, the European population in the rural
areas were not excluded from this wanton barbarity.
These
villages were not a new idea, in fact, the concept of the Protected
Village system was successfully
applied by the British military in Malaya, in
the 1950’s .
The
first Protected Villages [ PVs ] in the Tribal Trust Lands of Rhodesia were established during
1974 and became the responsibility of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs [ Intaf ].
Intaf
had the task of being in charge of these rural areas from an Administrative
standpoint and largely were responsible
for them. . Thus, the PVs fell under
their jurisdiction in this regard.
Very
soon Intaf personnel and its administrative structures became priority targets
of insurgent operations. Intaf lost many of their members to the enemy in the
course of their unenviable duties in the rural regions. When it became clear
that Intaf’s primary administrative role suffered because of its protective
paramilitary commitments, political and military authorities decided to create
an autonomous force exclusively responsible for the security of PVs, and subsequent protection of their inhabitants.
Guard Force was thus born.
It
should be mentioned that neither the Rhodesian Army nor the BSAP was prepared
to take over the function of Protected Villages. Their remit was one of
pro-active defence of the country. Or as it was expressed by officials that “to have burdened
the Rhodesian Army with such defensive tasks would dilute its strength and
offensive ethos “.
On the
1st of August 1975 Major General G.A.D. Rawlins OLM, a retired
General of the Rhodesian Army, was appointed as the first Commander of Guard
Force. He was a strong supporter of the idea to create a separate dedicated
force for the protection of the rural areas, where up to now, a great deal of “local support “was offered to the
insurgents. Brigadier W.A. Godwin became Deputy Commander.
The
first officers and senior NCOs for Guard Force were signed on in
August/September 1975. The task before them was to establish Guard Force
Headquarters, and the design, structures and initial modus operandi of the
Force. There was very close liaison with members of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. Starting in October 1975 Brigadier Godwin and other senior officers
conducted visits to existing Protected Villages, in order to familiarise
themselves with the workings of the villages and their future role in their
well-being.
In
October 1975 Guard Force Headquarters was established in Salisbury.
It accommodated the offices of the Commander and Deputy Commander Guard
Force and the Staff Divisions necessary to support them and the deployed units
and headquarters in the field. Deployed Guard Force elements were falling under
the Operational Control of Joint
Operation Centres [ JOCs ], as other military units were, on different levels. It is worthy of note that
Guard Force personnel in the field were transpiring into a sizable force that
JOC’s were becoming increasingly reliant upon.
They tended to operate in areas that were previously considered
‘liberated’ by the insurgents (and to some extent by the Rhodesian
authorities), and from that viewpoint their contribution was well considered at
Brigade level.
On 1st
February 1976 Guard Force was officially gazetted as an autonomous force under
the Ministry of Defence. [Government Notice 1203 of 1975]
On the 17th February 1977 Major
General Rawlins retired from Guard Force and was succeeded by Brigadier W.A.
Godwin OLM, DMM, OBE and his Deputy, Air
Commodore H.J. Pringle ICD, OLM, OBE, MID . Both of them served in their posts
until the stand down of the Force, as great servants of the unit.
In
January 1976 the first Guard Force elements arrived at Chikurubi Barracks to
establish the Guard Force
Training Center
[ GFTC ]. This was to be later re-named as the Guard Force Regimental Depot [ GFRD ] in 1977.
Offices, quarters and training facilities were shared in those early
days, with Intaf, leading sometimes to an uneasy relationship. It should be
understood that whilst Intaf were doing a tremendous role in the rural areas
they had the difficult task of being ‘friend and protector’ to the local
population…..when Guard Force took over the latter role it became a difficult
alliance between Guard Force and Intaf in those initial stages. Time would
prove however that in general, the two units did work well together for the
benefit of the locals and of course to the detriment of the insurgents..
At a
later stage other structures, which included Quartermaster Stores, Detention
Barracks, Armoury, Motor Transport Section, Signals Section and a Sick
Bay /
Hospital , formed part of the GFRD. Some elements from the Quartermaster Stores
and Signals Section moved at a later stage to other facilities in Salisbury.
The 9th
of February 1976 saw the beginning of the first Keep Commander Course. That
initial course ran until the 2nd
of April 1976. In total the unit ran in excess of some 16 KC courses during its
life, turning out some 400 KCs/Dep KCs.
The
first Basic Training Course started on the 14th of February. The
Passing-Out Parade took place on the 18th June 1976. Inspecting
Officer was the Minister of Defence , P
K Van der Byl. Adressing the Guard Force
soldiers on parade, he stated that “ from
henceforth, to you will fall the responsibility for the protection and safety
of the civilian population of the villages “.
On the
1st of July 1976 the Headquarter of Group 1 Bindura / Madziwa was established, leading to the first operational deployment
of Guard Force soldiers. This was followed by the establishment of Group 2
Chipinga on the 20th December 1976.
On the
6th of December 1976, 85 “ D “ Category National Service members
started their training. D Cat personnel
were in essence men of ‘military age’, but older than 25 years of age approx. and had not as yet undergone any other
military training.
By the end of 1976, 2500 African recruits had completed their four week
basic tailormade training. European National Service members, and Territorial
Force members had to undergo a ten weeks
training programme.
Others
were trained with intakes at Llewellin Barracks / Bulawayo.
As the role of Guard Force changed over time, training was adopted to a
more Infantry orientated counter-insurgency
[ COIN ] training and the
duration of training was extended. Specialist Courses for signallers, drivers,
medics, military policemen, clerks, storemen and drill and weapon instructors
were conducted at Chikurubi.
A
Guard Force Battlecamp was set up on a
farm north of Salisbury
to ensure that the leadergroup received
practical and realistic training in all aspects of COIN including live firing
exercises.
Group
Headquarters , situated close to the local JOC, BSAP Station and D.C. Camp,
were established to exercise command and control over a large number of PVs.
Sometimes the number and dispersal of
PVs made it necessary to subdivide group areas and to establish interim command
posts known as Forward Command Posts. Guard Force Group Headquarters were established in Bindura / Madziwa , Chipinga, Chiredzi,
Honde Valley, Mrewa, Mtoko,
Mudzi, Beitbridge and Mt.Darwin .This in effect covered the
Operational areas which had already been established.
Each PV, occupied by a few thousand rural
African families, was surrounded by a high wire diamond-mesh fence. Within the
PV was a fortified strong point known as the “ Keep “. It was occupied and “
defended “ by about 20 African guards and a European Keep Commander and a
European Deputy Keep Commander. (Having two European Senior NCOs was a bit of a
luxury and in reality each PV was headed up by either a KC or Deputy KC
depending upon circumstances ]..
The
entire success of the system depended on the control and checking of everyone
and everything that left or entered the PV through the prescribed entry and
exit points. Food and provisions control
was priority. There was a dusk to dawn
curfew enforced and nobody was allowed to be outside the perimeter fence during
hours of darkness. In effect locals largely went about their own business
outside of the confines of the PV, their only restriction was that they had to
be inside the area after dusk. That arrangement suited both sides as the
military were attempting to cut the insurgents off from the locals whilst the
locals were given the protection of the PVs during hours of darkness.
Other
operational activities included Perimeter Fence Patrols, Clearance Patrols
during daytime in the close proximity of the PV, Mine Clearance Patrols on
roads leading to and from the PV, Escort Duties and defending the PV against
any attack by insurgents. At any one time it was fairly common to have Ground
Coverage or Special Branch plain clothes officers working within the PV and the
KCs had to have full knowledge of any ‘Intelligence’ going on inside the
village.
Starting
May 1977, Guard Force was adopting a new
approach “ to cope more effectively with infantry situations “. From a
previously static and protective role the force engaged in all aspects of
Counter-insurgency operations [ COIN
] in their respective Group areas of
responsibility within the network of PVs and local areas.
The
scale of this more aggressive approach depended largely on the commanders on
the ground. Training standards, lack of
support weapons and equipment placed a limit on this more offensive
responsibility and sometimes commanders
ignored the fact that the not so popular main role of Guard Force was to protect and therefore be more defensive in
its application. A point which was difficult
to accept by the more aggressive younger white leader group and
commanders who came from a conventional military background, and were eager to
‘take the war’ to the insurgents rather than to permit the war to be brought to
them..
This
point was also valid for the increasingly large group of foreign volunteers and
TF members serving with Guard Force. The question could be asked if the leader
group deployed as Keep Commanders and their Deputies fully understood and
accepted the role they had to play in ensuring the proper and effective
functioning of the Protected Village System within the wider Security Strategy.
The role was well founded, it was an absolute necessity but by the latter
stages of the war the question was continually being asked. ‘Can one of the largest units in the
Rhodesian Security Forces continue to have the luxury of performing a mainly
static role’?
The
permanent change over of mostly white
key personnel did not always give them
enough time to fully understand the rural African environment and
prescribed security tasks within the PV and the surrounding area. In other
words , were their efforts being misdirected , and could a more strategic
responsibility be found for them? To have a significant manpower resource and
not use it to its fullest capability was folly.
Guard
Force personnel consisted of a regular contract based leader group [ African and white Officers ,
Warrant Officers and senior NCOs including quite a number of non-Rhodesian
volunteers], white National Servicemen who served for 18 month and soldiers who belonged to the 25 to 38 years age bracket who served their appointed call-ups in Guard
Force.
During
November 1978 a number of newly commissioned Officers who had undergone an
officers course at the School
of Infantry in Gwelo were
posted to Guard Force. On the 19th of May 1979 the first two African
cadets were commissioned as Officers. Most African Officers served as Warrant
Officers or Senior NCOs with RAR before joining Guard Force where they were
commissioned at a later stage . The rank and file were African volunteers on an
initial three year contract . In 1979 the total strength of Guard Force
numbered over 7000 members. No confirmed detailed figures are available.
The strategy applied to react to the changes
in the security situation and threat against the country led to changes in the role of Guard Force . In 1978
Combined Operations [ ComOps ] produced a strategy with coherent goals, based
on the political and military realities after the March 1978 political
settlement, and the formation of the Transitional Government of Muzorewa. The
first and most important goal of the new strategy, which led to a change in the
role of Guard Force, was “ Protecting Vital Asset Ground “ [ mines, factories,
key farming areas, bridges, railways, fuel depots, etc. ] The political decision by
the Transitional Government to open the PVs was another contributing factor.
The Transitional Government hoped that the opening of PVs would influence the
attitude of the local population to support moderate black nationalist leaders.
By December 1978 all PVs in the Mrewa, Mtoko, Mudzi Districts and 20 PVs in the
Mt. Darwin District had been opened .
In
other areas Security Forces lifted all restrictions of movement by people living
in PVs and in October 1978 PVs in the
Beitbridge, Chiredzi, Chipinga, Mutasa and Mt.Darwin Areas were taken over from
Guard Force by Security Force Auxiliaries [ SFA ]. By 1979 the Transitional
Government acknowledged that the opening
of PVs was a mistake because people returning to their homes fell victim to
terrorism because they were no longer protected.
The withdraw
of Guard Force from the PVs made a large number of soldiers available for other
tasks and led to the decision by political and military authorities to deploy
Guard Force to protect National Vital Assets like European Farming Areas ,
Railway Lines and vital industrial and commercial enterprises. Before these new
deployments and the establishment of new units and HQs, elements of Guard Force operated for a few months
in a COIN role in their Group areas of responsibility. (Principally but
not restricted to the Operation Hurricane area in the NW). This seemed to be
the initial start of the ‘soon to be’
Infantry Battalions of Guard Force.
Retraining and deployment of these elements
within their Group areas continued into the second half of 1978 . Their
operational activities and deployments can be seen as the forerunners of the
newly formed Infantry Battalions. This was a testing period for the new Guard
Force, and as history would dictate it worked.
An
unprecedented onslaught on the land to disrupt the economy of the country and
to drive commercial farmers off the land, led to an increase of attacks and
terror directed against the commercial farming community, homesteads and other
farming assets, the farmers themselves, their families and farm labourers and
their families. The manpower of the country (principally the European effort)
was stretched to breaking point and due to their experiences of the culture and
of the land any farmers were being called up into BSAP (PATU). Therefore the
protection of these assets fell to a very large extent upon Guard Force.
The
farmer became a top soft target on the frontline of this conflict. The vital necessity,
as spelled out in the Security Strategy of the country, to maintain the
commercial farmer on the land required the provision of security for his
family, home and labour. To achieve this objective , Guard Force took over the
protection of Key Farming Areas together and
in close cooperation with BSAP /. PATU and other Security Force
elements. It began with the deployment of about 500 GF soldiers during 1978.
Regional and Area Headquarters ,
ensuring proper Command and Control were established in the Operational
Areas HURRICANE, THRASHER, REPULSE,
TANGENT and GRAPPLE covering most of the commercial farming areas. GF soldiers
were deployed to individual farms, with the local control centre being based at
the BSAP offices.
.Their
task was to assist the farmer in security related tasks, clearance patrols,
escort duties and defending the farm homestead, the farmer and his family and
labour against attacks by insurgents. Reaction Forces were based at the
relevant HQs. Local Reaction Forces were based at BSAP Stations and worked
closely with BSAP / PATU. Some Regional / Area Headquarters responsibilities
included the protection of Government and Municipality installations and
industrial and commercial enterprises of vital importance to the economy of the
country. Protection of key installations in Salisbury
led to the establishment of a Guard Force Urban Protection Group based at New
Sarum / Salisbury
during 1979.
In May
1979 1 Battalion Guard Force [ 1BN ] was formally established, using the manpower from GP 5
Mrewa, GP 6 Mtoko and GP 7 Mudzi and later GP 8 Beitbridge . During the first
few months of its existence, companies of the Battalion operated in an
area-bound COIN Infantry role in their former Group areas . In September 1979
the Battalion was allocated the task to protect the Railway Line between
Beitbridge and Gwelo. 1 BN consisted of six Companies and a HQ element which
was based at Rutenga. This railway
line to South Africa
was the lifeline of the country and was given a high Defence priority.
Shortly
thereafter 2 Battalion Guard Force [
2 BN ] was established with the responsibility to protect the Railway Line
between Bulawayo and Victoria
Falls . Its HQ was situated at the Cyrene Mission near Bulawayo. (Horst, from
which Groups were these men drawn?....HQ Delta etc?)
3
Battalion Guard Force [ 3 BN ] was the last established Guard Force unit with
its HQ at Stamford Farm west of Salisbury
. The Battalion deployed its companies as
independent operating Infantry companies
and played an important role during the period leading up to the March
1980 election.
Changes in the role of Guard Force did not change the role of the
individual Guard Force members who fought as soldiers from the day of the
establishment of Guard Force as the fourth arm of the Rhodesian Security Forces
to the final days of the Bush War.
On the
day, when the deployed units in the field received the signal from
Guard Force Headquarters to stand down was an emotional time for all..
It was a sad moment reading the signal which cited the words
of Rudyard Kipling, the great poet of
the British Empire (and friend of the common
soldier), “ ……….
now, the time has come to quietly unfurl your tents and fade away ……” .
For
the 206 soldiers of the Guard Force, black and white, who made the ultimate
sacrifice, their final rollcall came before this painful day.
Keep
Cmdr Charles Provis , the last Guard Force casualty of the War, was killed on
the 15 March 1980 on active service. As a soldier he fought and as a soldier he
died.
Guard Force units and HQs stood down between
the 11 May and 25 June 1980.
For
the thousands of African Guard Force soldiers,
who survived the Rhodesian War, the future became bleak. Seen by the new
Government as an “ irregular unit
brought into existence solely for fighting the war “, Guard Force was not considered for integration into the new
Zimbabwe National Army. Individual African Guard Force officers, Warrant
Officers and NCO’s made it into the new Army, including a few white officers.
Most white soldiers who were part of the conscription / call-up system went
back to their civilian lives. Others who served as contract based regulars continued
soldiering “down south “ or looked for
civilian jobs. . Foreigners went back to their home countries or continued
fighting wars in other distant places.
In the
years after 1980 many of the former white Rhodesians left the country and tried to start a new
life in other places. For others, the country they called home was no longer.
Most white Rhodesians when called up to serve their country ,did so , and many
of them served with Guard Force. All that was left, was to recall and
record bygone days and the challenges
they faced in defending keeps and Protected Villages, farming communities , securing railway lines, and protecting other vital assets. The comfort that these men brought to the
families both black and white under their protection may never be fully
appreciated. Patrols, OP’s, contacts, ambushes, landmines , escort duties
,sweeps and other terms from the COIN handbook became their daily vocabulary…all in the service of others, continuing that great
tradition of military men the world over.. .
The
list of challenges Guard Force soldiers under deployment faced is endless, but
there was very little recognition given for what they have achieved. No regular
military Force wanted to be involved in protective / defensive tasks. These
tasks have been seen as frustrating, sapping the morale of the soldiers and causing
ill discipline, in addition to the danger incurred. Success in protecting Vital
Asset Ground [ railways, key farming areas, bridges etc, ] or denying the
insurgents the access to the rural African population [ Protective Villages ]
cannot be measured by the number of insurgents killed. Had the insurgents not faced this barrier
the war would have been lost very much sooner
Guard
Force , RDR, BSAP, Intaf and other defensive elements of the Security Forces provided
the protective shield so that the sword, consisting of the elite units of the
Security Forces, could strike and
destroy the enemy. This very subtle but nevertheless extremely valid assertion
is often misunderstood at best, and ignored at worst. Without the protection of
those assets and resources, the aggressive aspects become null and void. Both
elements, the shield and the sword , were necessary to defend the country
against a multifaced revolutionary threat. Guard Force soldiers were part of this
total and integrated effort to counter this threat against their country. They
have done their duty, against all odds,
and nobody can take this away from them. What others may say about Guard
Force is not important and is largely based in not understanding the role Guard
Force played in the total war effort.
In
January 1979, the white Joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order in the
Transitional Government, Hilary Squires, reassured white National Servicemen
allocated to Guard Force that “ it is one of the
most crucial arms of the Security Forces and that it was essential to keep
areas clear of insurgents and this was the function of Guard Force “ and he
added that “ you are likely to be in the
frontline contacts, just as much as anyone else “. Perhaps he may have added that their function expanded
and the force eventually became both ‘protector and assailant ..
We
ourselves know - and therefore we can say that “ we are proud to have served as soldiers in the Rhodesian Guard Force “ - and we must say so at the top of our
voices..
P.S. The content of this article is
based on input from former Guard Force soldiers and information contained in
the following publications, articles and websites :
·
Peter Abbott / Philip
Bothham : Modern African Wars [1] : Rhodesia
1965 – 80 : Osprey, London
1986.
·
Fighting Forces of Rhodesia Vol.5
: The Guard Force – fiercely loyal and protective. CentAfrican
Press Publications, Salisbury
1978.
·
Dr. Jakkie Cilliers : Counter-Insurgency
in Rhodesia.: Croom Helm, Beckenham 1985 and Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria [ scan ].
·
AAM : Fire Force
exposed.: AAM, London
1979.
·
Peter Godwin / Ian
Hancock : Rhodesians Never Die.: Pan Macmillan. Northlands, 1993.
·
Trevor Grundy / Bernard
Miller : The Farmer at War.: Modern Farming Publications, Salisbury
1979.
·
Norma Kriger : Guerilla
Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe
: Cambridge University Press 2003.
·
Paresh Pandya : Mao
Tse-tung and Chimurenga.: Skotaville, Braamfontein 1988.
·
Nhowo , Vol Oct 76 : Maj Gen G.A.D. Rawlins, OLM :
Guard Force News.
·
Dudley Wall : Website :
Rhodesia
– Intaf.
·
Dr. J.R.T. Wood :
Countering the Chimurenga – The Rhodesian Counter Insurgency Campaign 1962 –
80. [ Chapter 10 in D. Marston / C.
Malkasian : Counter Insurgency in Modern Warfare ].: Osprey, London 1986.
·
Valuable written informations were provided by former
A/Comdt Mark Axworthy and military historian and collector Mr. Craig Fourie.